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Economists  are  not  known  for  making  bold  predictions  or  giving unconditional advice. This professional trait was strikingly expressed by President Harry Truman, when he famously said: “I was in search of  a  one‐armed  economist,  so  that  the  guy  could  never  make  a statement and then say “On the other hand””.i  Yet, the economists’ discussion of the euro seems to be the exception to  this  saying. Right  from  the  start,  and  coming mostly  from Anglo‐Saxon economists,  there was no dearth of predictions  that  the euro would  fail.  The  most  extreme  predicted  a  failure  so  dismal,  that  it might  even  provoke  a  war  among  European  states.ii  The  contrast between  these  views  and  those  held  by  European  economists, especially those associated with the European Commission, seems to rather vindicate George Bernard Shaw’s aphorism: “If all economists were laid end to end, they would not reach a conclusion”.iii  Today,  regarding  the  euro,  there  is  further  evidence  that  not  only George  Bernard  Shaw  seems  to  be  right  but  also  Harry  Truman would have no problem finding one‐armed economists. Even among European  economists,  there  are  diverging  views  and  predictions.  A recent  example  of  disputing  economists  offering  different  bold predictions,  is  that  of  the  well‐known  professors  Wyplosz  and Neumann.  Professor Charles Wyplosz  addressed an open  letter  last November to  the  head  of  the  Bundesbank,  Dr.  Jens  Weidmann.iv  In  this,  he asserts  that  “the  debt  crisis  will  not  come  to  an  end  until  the  ECB intervenes as lender of last resort”. If the ECB refuses to intervene, as Dr. Weidmann would have it, then the euro zone will break up. Professor  Manfred  Neumann,  on  the  other  hand  (if  such  an expression is not offensive in a discussion of one‐armed economists), totally  disagrees.  In  a  recent  conference,v  he  sided  fully  with  Dr. Weidmann  (who was his doctoral student) on the needlessness and 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indeed  undesirability  of  ECB  intervention.  Moreover,  he  made  the bold prediction that Greece would be out of the euro zone by the end of 2012. These  divergent  views  and  predictions  are  clearly  based  on differences  in  the  diagnosis  of  the  urgent  problem  facing  the European economy today. It is therefore essential to briefly examine this, so as to clarify the nature of what has come to be known as the euro crisis.  
1) What is the euro crisis?  In  the  first  instance,  it  is  the  inability  of  three  European  states participating in the euro zone, Greece to start with and then Ireland and  Portugal,  to  finance  their  debt.  The  inability  of  these  states  to borrow  in  order  to  meet  their  obligations  might  prove  contagious and could threaten a number of other countries with a high ratio of debt to GDP. This is because the potential default of a member of the euro  zone  heightens  the  perception  of  risk  for  other  member countries,  thus  raising  their  costs  of  borrowing  and  pushing  them also towards default. Moreover,  an  aggravating  factor  is  that  the  whole  euro  zone’s banking  and  financial  system  is  fragile  and,  following  the American subprime debacle,  it  is widely  perceived  to  be  in  a weak  condition. The difficulties in financing the sovereign debt of the three countries above  clearly  weaken  it  further,  since  banks  across  the  euro  zone hold sovereign debt issued by the three peripheral countries.  To  the  extent  that  the  state  in  other  European  countries  might  be obliged to step in and strengthen its own banking system, the risk of that state’s defaulting increases. This increases its cost of borrowing, which  further  increases  the  risk  of  default.  This  vicious  circle  of increasing risk perception converges to a cost of borrowing that may be high enough to actually make default inevitable. So, what initially surfaced as a Greek debt crisis risks engulfing many other countries, most importantly Italy, Spain and Belgium, thus becoming a crisis of the euro. If this is not resolved, the existence of the euro zone, at least in its present form, will be endangered. 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2) What triggered the crisis? As  George  Soros  has  pointed  out,  “the  euro  crisis  is  a  direct consequence  of  the  crash  of  2008”,  when  Lehman  Brothers  was allowed to fail and the global financial system started to collapse. The European  finance  ministers  correctly  responded  to  this  threat  by guaranteeing,  in November 2008,  that  no  other  financial  institution of systemic importance would be allowed to fail.  “Angela Merkel then declared that the guarantee should be exercised by  each European  state  individually,  not  by  the  European Union  or the  euro  zone  acting  as  a whole.  This  sowed  the  seeds  of  the  euro crisis  because  it  revealed  and  activated  a  hidden  weakness  in  the construction  of  the  euro:  the  lack  of  a  common  treasury.  The  crisis itself erupted more than a year later, in 2010”.vi   Mrs. Merkel’s declaration ensured that the markets’ attention would be concentrated on whether each individual country’s public finances could  support  its  own  banking  system.  After  this,  it  was  inevitable that the economically weakest countries with the least healthy public finances  would  sooner  or  later  come  under  attack.  Greece was  the first,  mainly  because  of  its  boundless  political  strife  and  the inexcusable falsification of national statistics for political advantage.  
3) What is the root of the crisis? Here we reach the root of the present crisis.  It  is now clear that the absence of a common treasury rendered the construction of the euro deficient from the start.   Was this not realized at  the time?  It seems not.  It was believed that the conditions of the Maastricht Treaty stipulating, that 1) the debt to GDP ratio should not exceed 60% of GDP and 2) there should not be budget deficits over 3% of GDP, were enough to ensure avoidance of excessive debt. The above rules were, of course, breached right from the start. Italy, Belgium and Greece joined the euro zone with debt to GDP ratios far above 60%, on promise that these ratios would tend in the future to converge  towards  the  60%  threshold.  Moreover,  France  and Germany have breached the 3% budget deficit rule in order to avoid recession  at  least  6  times  each,  with  the  total  number  of  breaches reaching 30.vii 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Unfortunately, the official thinking has always been that there is not any  serious weakness  in  the  euro  construction  other  than  the  poor implementation  of  these  rules.viii  The  December  2011  European Summit established a new  legally enforceable  “fiscal compact”, with the  European  Commission  approving  national  budgets  in  advance.  Government budgets must be balanced or in surplus, with the annual structural  deficit  not  to  exceed  0.5%  of  GDP,  and  highly  indebted countries  must  reduce  the  debt  in  excess  of  60%  by  1/20th  on average annually. Leaving  aside  the  wisdom  and  enforceability  of  an  arrangement,ix which deprives governments of their most potent anti‐cyclical tool by effectively  making  Keynesianism  illegal,  could  this  be  a  credible response  to  the  euro  crisis?  Is  the  crisis  solely  due  to  excessive government  borrowing?  Or  is  it,  as  Soros  claims,  the  absence  of  a common treasury and the German insistence on a nationalist rather than European approach to the threat of a financial meltdown that is at the origin of the crisis? If one focuses on the Greek and Portuguese cases, the official thinking might  seem  credible.  But  it  is  clearly  given  the  lie  by  the  case  of Ireland.  There  is  no  question  that  Ireland  was  a  model  of  fiscal rectitude. The main reason that the Irish government had to borrow heavily was in order to save its banks. If Merkel had not ruled out a European  guarantee  for  the  banking  system,  the  Irish  banks would not have come under attack and the Irish sovereign debt (which was just at 25% of GDP in 2007) would be perfectly satisfactory. (It may be noted that Moody’s rated it Aaa until 2007 and Aa2 until the end of  2010.  This  is  more  than  two  years  after  the  government  was obliged to guarantee, without any European support, the safety of the over‐extended Irish banks). Similarly, Spain had a debt of about 30%  in 2007 and  its debt  ratio was  even  in  the beginning  of  2010  less  than  that  of Britain,  France and Germany. But its fragile banking system, in combination with the bursting  of  a  real  estate  bubble,  put  its  sovereign  debt  under  great pressure following the debt crisis of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Consequently, it is difficult to accept that the euro zone’s problem is excessive sovereign debt. This official diagnosis misses the root of the 
crisis, which  is  to be  found  in  the unfinished construction of  the euro. As a  result,  the  remedy proposed  is not only  likely  to be  ineffective but risks damaging the health of the euro zone both economically, by deepening  the  recession,  and  politically,  by  undermining  solidarity 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and  feeding  chauvinist  attitudes.  It  may  thus,  inadvertently  lead  to the breakup and unraveling of the euro zone. The appropriate remedy based on the correct diagnosis should be to complete  the  construction  of  the  euro  by  creating  a  common treasury. This would be  in  accordance with  Jean Monnet’sx  “theorie d’engrenage”, which has guided the building of Europe from the very beginning.  This  theory  is  based  on  the  idea  that  a  federal  United States  of  Europe  is  desirable  and,  given  that  this  is  not  at  any  time feasible  politically  in  one  step,  a  succession  of  steps  of  unequal amplitude will be required over time. The theory postulates that any one  step  will  lead  to  an  unfinished  construction  but,  through  its unfinished nature,  it will create forces pushing forward towards the further  building  and  eventual  construction  of  a  federal  European state. The name of the theory (engrenage) evokes an analogy with a complex  clockwork‐type  mechanism  made  up  of  numerous cogwheels of varying size, in which any cog movement is transmitted to the whole mechanism pushing forward the other cogwheels.  
4) What are main lessons of the crisis? The  euro  crisis  has  recently  abated  but  Europe’s  problems  are  still not over. There are certain mistakes and omissions of policy‐making, which  seem  clear  by  now.  What  are  the  main  lessons  that  can  be drawn and, if heeded, may help in improving economic policy in the future?  The  most  obvious  ones  have  been  clearly  presented  by  Lawrence Summers  (former  US  Treasury  Secretary,  Harvard  Professor  and former President of Harvard University).xi  I  summarize  them briefly below,  before  proceeding  to  discuss  at  length  a  less  evident  one, which has received little attention by economists.  1) Timid actions, which do not patently exceed the minimum necessary 
to achieve stability, are likely to fail. This is especially the case, if they are accompanied by dubious assertions and announcements of vague programs. The reluctance to assist Greece at the start, the subsequent about‐face with an inadequate first Memorandum and initial PSI, the underfunding  of  the  EFSF  and  the  ESM  are  relevant  examples. Europe’s  half‐hearted  attempts  to  resolve  the  crisis,  clearly demonstrate  that  “attempts  to  purchase  solutions  on  the  cheap  are more likely to exacerbate problems than to resolve them”. 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2)  Sovereign  debt  crises,  if  not  actually  caused  by  slow  growth, certainly  become  worse  by  lack  of  growth  and  deflation.  As  shown amply in the present crisis, the efficacy of austerity measures is often overestimated by neglecting the adverse effects on growth and hence on  tax  receipts.  The  deterioration  in  the  business  climate  and  the consumers’  confidence,  which  the  austerity  measures  bring  about, contributes to this and causes a slowing down of the economy, even when  the  austerity measures  are not  fully  implemented  (as  seen  in the Greek case). It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  IMF  has  announced  at  its  October 2012  annual  meeting  in  Tokyo,  that  fiscal  multipliers  have  been greater than normal in this recession. Negative multipliers have been in the range of 0.9 to 1.7,  instead of the standard assumption of 0.5. This  is  because,  with  interest  rates  near  zero  and  credit  strongly constrained,  the  private  sector  did  not  compensate  for  the  budget deficit reduction by expanding private investment and consumption. 3) Containing  systemic  financial  risk  through  fiscal  contraction  is not 
enough  to  restore  growth.  Fiscal  contraction  may  be  necessary  in order  to  reduce  debt  and  eliminate  systemic  financial  risk,  so  that future  growth  is  based  on  a  healthier  and  firmer  foundation,  but  it cannot  be  expected  to  initiate  or  encourage  expansion  of  economic activity.  The  historical  examples  of  expansionary  fiscal  contraction were based on the possibility of devaluation and strong demand for exports. Both of these conditions are absent in Greece and the other peripheral  European  economies,  which  are  presently  subjected  to austerity programs.  
 
5) What is the less evident lesson? Let us now move on  to our  final  lesson  from the recent handling of the crisis. This  lesson is  less evident in economic writing because of the strong  tendency  (one could even say, professional deformation) of  economists  to  assume  that  economic  agents  are  fully  rational. Despite  the  evidence  garnered  by  psychologists  and  behavioral economists in the last few decades, which convincingly demonstrates the doubtful validity of this assumption, economists find it difficult to admit the importance of non‐rational behavior. What then is the less evident lesson? 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This is that human emotions can play an important role in the march of history while rationality cannot be assumed to always prevail.xii In particular, national pride and prejudice are psychological attitudes or traits,  which  can  influence  the  unfolding  of  events  in  uncertain  and 
dangerous ways that do not make rational sense.xiii To substantiate  this claim,  it  is necessary  to dwell on certain recent events in some detail. In fact, I will devote the central part of my talk (with minor digressions) on the discussion of this issue. On  Sept.16,  2011,  US  Treasury  Secretary,  Timothy  Geithner,  was invited  to  give  a  speech  at  a  meeting  of  the  euro  zone  finance ministers  in  Wroclaw,  Poland.  Geithner  warned  of  “catastrophic risks”  if  the  seventeen  eurozone  countries  did  not  act  decisively  to resolve  the  sovereign  debt  crisis.  Though  he  did  not  propose  any particular plan or action, he urged Europe to provide its bailout fund with  more  firepower,  in  order  to  send  a  strong  and  convincing message  to  the markets. For  this, he pointed out,  it  is also essential that  governments  and  the  central  bank  speak  with  one  voice  and there is no “loose talk about dismantling the institutions of the euro”. This  advice  sounds  quite  reasonable,  yet  it  was  badly  received, judging from the response  it evoked.  Jean‐Claude Juncker, president of  the Eurogroup  finance ministers,  said  that European officials  did not  care  to have detailed discussions  about  expanding  their  bailout fund  “with  a  nonmember  of  the  euro  area”.  Didier  Reynders,  the Belgian  finance minister,  said  that Mr. Geithner should  listen rather than talk. Finally, Maria Fekter, finance minister of Austria, “found it peculiar  that,  even  though  the  Americans  have  significantly  worse fundamental  data  than  the  euro  zone,  they  tell  us  what  we  should do”. It  may  be  true  that  Europe’s  fundamentals  are  not  too  bad.  In  Mr. Trichet’s  words  (Trichet  was  the  Governor  of  ECB  until  January  1, 2012) “if the euro zone were a single country, it would actually look like  a  model  economy,  with  a  small  current  account  surplus,  a primary  budget  deficit  of  less  than  half  that  of  the  UK  and  the  US, subdued household debt, low inflation and a little growth”. Moreover, its consolidated debt  falls short of  the US and  Japanese ones. But  to disregard the present vulnerability of the euro and the threat it poses to the world economy, and the American one in particular, would be inexcusably complacent. 
  8 
The state of public confidence in the American economy is extremely low and this bodes ill for its growth prospects. As Yale’s Prof. Robert Shiller has noted, the expectations of the American public of how well the  country will be doing over  the next  five years are at  the  lowest ebb in thirty years.xiv  Sovereign debt defaults in Europe and, even more so, a collapse of the euro zone will affect the American and indeed the world economy not only through their effect on the state of confidence but also, and more immediately,  through  the  financial  linkages  of  an  ever  more interdependent  and  intertwined  global  economic  system.  It  is, therefore, not surprising that the American government is concerned about Europe’s sovereign debt problem. The fact  that the country  is soon in an electoral year adds urgency and enhances this concern. The above explanation of the US government’s concern for Europe’s financial  stability  may  be  contested  by  those  holding  the  not uncommon  view,  that  Europe  has  an  antagonistic  relationship with the  US  in  international  finance.  Consequently,  it  may  be  argued, America’s fundamental interest is in undermining rather than saving the  euro.  This  view may,  at  first  sight,  seem plausible  but  does  not hold water, at least under the present circumstances.  It  is  true  that  the existence of  the euro and  its  expanding  role  as  a medium of international payments makes it an international reserve currency  in  competition  with  the  American  dollar.  This  clearly reduces  the  seigniorage  gain  and  restricts  the margin  of maneuver that  the  US  possesses  in  running  current  account  deficits  without risking  a  fall  in  the  dollar’s  exchange  rate.  But  the  relationship between  the  US  and  Europe  is  symbiotic  rather  than  purely antagonistic.  A symbiotic relationship  includes both competition and cooperation as potential modes. Competition is not unlimited but bounded, giving way to cooperation when there  is a  threat to the existence of either side, while cooperation is always possible and may arise even when gains  are  unequally  shared  between  the  two  sides.  Symbiotic relationships are quite common in nature but may also be observed in international relations and economic life. Despite the emphasis on competition  in  economic  thinking,  there  are  many  instances  of cooperation  in  economic  life  and  a  lot more  for which  cooperation could  be  a  superior  alternative  to  competition.  Harvard’s  Prof.  A. Brandenburger  with  Yale’s  Prof.  B.  Nalebuff,  coined  the  term  “co‐opetition”  (in  their  book  of  the  same  titlexv)  to  describe  the  co‐
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existence of competition and cooperation, as well as  the alternation between  the  two  behavioral  modes,  in  actual  business  practice. Moreover,  they  argue  convincingly  that  business  strategies,  which recognize and use  the potential  for cooperation, can be  far superior to strategies resulting from a purely competitive mentality. It  seems  quite  probable  that  the  US  government  views  America’s relationship to Europe as a symbiotic one. This interpretation seems, at least, to be in accord with the sequence of events, which followed the Eurogroup finance ministers’ meeting.  Mr. Geithner did not give up in the face of European criticism. About a week  later,  at  the  annual  meeting  of  the  IMF,  he  warned  that  the European  debt  crisis  is  “the most  serious  risk  now  confronting  the world  economy”  and  strongly  emphasized  the  need  for  immediate action on the part of European leaders. In addition, two days later, US President Barack Obama made equally strong statements to the same effect. His exact words were that “They (i.e. the Europeans) are going through a financial crisis that is scaring the world, and they are trying to  take  responsible  actions,  but  those  actions haven’t  been quite  as quick as they need to be”. He attributed the problem to the fact that the Europeans “have not fully healed from the crisis back in 2007 and never  fully  dealt  with  all  the  challenges  that  their  banking  system faced. It’s now being compounded by what’s happening in Greece”. What was the European reaction to Obama and America’s second call for urgent action?  It was clearly not better than the first. The German finance  minister  Wolfgang  Schauble  responded  that  “it’s  always easier  to  give  other  people  advice”  and  “I  don’t  think  Europe’s problems  are  America’s  only  problems”,  while  other  German commentators dubbed Obama’s remarks “arrogant” and “absurd”.xvi  Is  there  any  rational  explanation  for  such  a  rebuff  of  a  seemingly reasonable  concern  by  an  erstwhile  trusted  ally  and  important trading partner? This is where pride makes an entrance. It is difficult to  think of  any  reason other  than  irrational and misguided national pride in explaining this stance. We  have  therefore  seen  pride  at  work;  what  about  prejudice?  For this, we must ask the next obvious question arising from our account of  events.  Why  has  it  been  so  difficult  to  take  action  in  order  to safeguard the euro and the European banking system? 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To answer this question, let us consider the most effective solution to Europe’s  financial crisis. This  is clearly to remedy what Soros called “the  hidden weakness  in  the  construction  of  the  euro”.  A  European Treasury needs to be created. The common treasury must be able to raise  taxes  across  the  euro  zone,  coordinate  and  control  national fiscal policies, issue bonds and perform all the functions required of a federal  state  treasury,  while  being  accountable  to  the  European Parliament.  There  is  no  doubt  that  this would  be  a  truly  great  step forward in the deepening of European integration and the realization of a federal state. The  second  major  reform  that  is  needed  concerns  the  role  of  the European  Central  Bank  (ECB).  The  ECB  should  be  responsible  not only  for  the  containment  of  inflation  but  also  for  the  proper functioning  of  the  financial  system  across  the  euro  zone,  being empowered  to  control  the  banking  system without  constraints  and operating,  without  inhibitions,  as  the  lender  of  last  resort  for  both financial institutions and national treasuries.xvii Either of these two reforms could have been a sufficient response to the crisis. The two reforms constitute jointly the first‐best solution to Europe’s  financial  problems.  If  they  were  adopted,  not  only  the present  crisis  could  immediately  come  to  an  end  but  also  it  might have  served  as  a  unique  opportunity  for  a  decisive  step  towards federal  Europe.  This  would  have  been  in  the  best  tradition  of European  integration,  which  has  tended  to  proceed  by  resolving problems  caused  from  incomplete  though  politically  feasible previous  measures.  But  politicians,  with  their  eyes  firmly  fixed  on their  electoral  chances  and  on  political  alliances  necessary  to governmental  coalitions,  are  not  ready  for  such major  advances  at present. Instead,  all  kinds  of  “red  lines”  are  drawn  by  the  main  decision‐makers, according  to  their estimations of what  is politically  feasible or non‐feasible, given their own interests and targets. Consequently, the most effective response is ruled out and we are inevitably in the realm  of  second‐best  solutions.  As  the  theory  of  the  second‐best implies,  there  is  no  clear  criterion  in  ranking  such  solutions  and deciding which is superior, which explains why it is difficult to arrive at  an agreed course of  action. Moreover,  in  the present  context,  the “red  lines” which  determine  the  possible  second‐best  solutions  are themselves  heavily  dependent  on  the  political  leaders’  personal courage and motivations. And, of course, prejudice in the electorate’s 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mind,  as  well  as  in  that  of  the  leaders,  is  an  important  factor  in drawing the “red lines”. Prejudice  against  the  creation  of  a  European  treasury  is,  of  course, understandable  among  euro‐skeptical  political  parties.  Any  move towards  a  common  treasury  clearly  implies  a  reduction  of  national sovereignty, as national  fiscal policy will need approval and may be subject  to  a  possible  veto  by  institutions  at  the  European  level. Moreover,  a  common  treasury  would  have  to  take  a  view  of  the economic  situation  and  needs  throughout  Europe  and  redistribute resources,  most  likely  from  the  strongest  to  the  weakest  countries and  regions.  It  is,  thus,  not  surprising  that  political  leaders  in Germany  and  other  economically  strong  countries  tread  cautiously with respect to this reform. Despite the attempt by Mr. Trichet to put the creation of a European Finance Minister on the agenda, all that is contemplated at present is stricter monitoring of public finances and the  imposition  of  sanctions  if  agreed  plans  are  violated.  This  on  its own is clearly insufficient as a response to the crisis. Prejudice  against  expanding  the  power  and  responsibilities  of  the European  Central  Bank(ECB)  is  more  difficult  to  understand.  This “red  line”  is  based  on  the German  fear  that  by  allowing  the  ECB  to directly  lend  to  governments,  the  euro  will  be  debased  and hyperinflation  will  follow,  as  happened  to  the  Weimar  Republic’s mark in the 1920s. But central banks all over the world lend to their governments without causing hyperinflation. The remote possibility of  huge  mismanagement  sometime  in  the  future  does  not  justify taking today the extreme risk of a financial meltdown, that can easily be  averted  by  an  adequately  empowered  central  bank.  As  Prof. Willem Buiter, Citigroup’s chief economist and former board member of  the Bank of England, has noted:  “The blanket prohibition against directly lending to governments is a complete idiocy… Just because it can be mismanaged does not mean you have to throw the tool away. You can drown in water but it does not mean you cannot have a glass when you are thirsty”.xviii The “red line” drawn by Mrs. Merkel, when she declared last October to  the  German  parliament  “all  models  that  depend  on  ECB participation are off the table”, seems to be a case of unfounded, pure prejudice.   
6) What is the present state of the euro crisis? 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7) What are the future prospects for Europe? It  has  been  argued  above,  that  the  root  cause  of  the  crisis  is  the absence  of  a  common  treasury.  As  long  as  this  is missing,  the  euro crisis will not disappear; it will only change form. Instead of surfacing as a sovereign debt and banking crisis, it will in the future appear as a North‐South competitiveness and growth discrepancy crisis. If a common treasury issuing eurobonds for all eurozone countries is not  instituted,  the borrowing costs of  creditor and debtor countries will continue to diverge. This divergence will not be as wide as at the height of the euro crisis but it may still be substantial. This handicap for the debtor countries will make it more difficult for them to reduce their  debt  to  GDP  ratios  and  will  require  larger  primary  budget surpluses. As  a  result,  they  are more  likely  to be  stuck  in  recession and  to  have  lower  growth  rates  than  the  creditor  countries. Moreover, their firms will also have higher borrowing costs (because of  the country  risk)  than  those  in creditor countries and will  find  it more difficult to compete.  Given this lack of a level playing field, it is probable that Europe will be divided on the basis of differential growth rates, with the northern creditor  countries  enjoying  higher  growth  rates  than  the  southern debtor  ones.  This  will  inevitably  create  tensions  between  the  two groups of  countries  and will  be damaging  to European  solidarity  in the longer run. Is there another way forward? It very much depends on Germany. If Germany opts for the establishment of a common treasury and for a monetary policy  that  takes  into  account  the need  for  growth of  the southern debtor economies, the euro crisis will be fully resolved. But how likely is this? To answer this, it may be worthwhile to look briefly at the historical trajectory  of  Europe’s  progress  so  far.  The  process  of  European integration has been always open‐ended. Two main orientations are discernible  from  early  on.  These  may  be  dubbed  “British”  and “German”  after  the  biggest  countries,  which  most  unfailingly  have espoused  them.    The  “British”  orientation  is  towards  a  European 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common  market  while  the  “German”  one  is  towards  a  European federal state.  The  implications  of  these  two  views  of  European  integration  with respect  to  national  sovereignty  are  clearly  quite  different.  The  first implies ceding the minimum of national sovereignty that is necessary for  the operation of  the  common market while  the  second  requires the  abandonment  of  national  sovereignty  for  the  realization  of  the federal state. Germany  used  to  assert  that  it  had  no  independent  foreign  policy, only  a  European  one.  But  the  German  public  seems  at  present unwilling to make concessions  for the sake of  federal Europe.  It has made  sacrifices  for  the  cause  of  German  reunification  and  then  for increasing Germany’s competitiveness  following  the adoption of  the euro.  Today, after more than two decades of austerity, it is in no mood for a “transfer  union”  that  will  reward  the  spendthrift  southerners  for their  profligate  ways,  which  is  how  the  common  treasury  will  be portrayed  by  its  opponents.  Moreover,  the  German  public  deeply distrusts a monetary policy, which pushes up the rate of  inflation in Germany. Consequently, given these prejudices, it is unlikely that the policy, which can fully resolve the eurozone crisis, will be adopted.xxi  
8)  What is Greece’s future? Time  is  running out  for Greece. The policy of  “internal devaluation” through fiscal contraction is causing a lot of pain. This is the fifth year that  the  economy  is  in  recession, with  GDP  this  year  falling  by  7% and  the  cumulative  GDP  reduction  exceeding  20%.  The  income  of civil  servants  and  pensioners  has  been  reduced  by  more  than  a quarter. In the private sector, a lot of businesses have folded up and unemployment  has  shot  up  to  nearly  25  percent  of  the  labor  force and  over  50  percent  among  the  young.  What  is  possibly  worse, investment prospects are bleak and there seems to be no end in sight of this downward trajectory. In  addition,  national  pride  is  deeply  hurt  and  prejudice,  especially against  Germany,  is  rife.  Greeks  are  particularly  resentful  about accusations  in  the  German  press  that  they  are  lazy  and  live  at  the expense  of  the  German  taxpayers.  This,  by  the  way,  is  completely 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unfounded as the latest OECD statistics demonstrate: Greeks work in fact  longer  than most  Europeans  including  the  Germans. Moreover, they  resent  being  used  as  scapegoats  for  the  faulty  design  of  the eurozone, for which Germany is largely responsible. Hurt  national  pride  tends  to  breed  prejudice.  Old  memories  of atrocities by the German occupation army, the huge loss in lives and the  destruction  inflicted  to  the  country  during  the  occupation,  are revived and exacerbated. Germans are seen as Nazis who are trying again  to  subjugate Greece  (and  eventually  the  rest  of  Europe),  only this  time using economic  instead of military power.  In addition,  the issue of war reparations, which has never been dealt with to Greece’s satisfaction,  inflames passions against Germany  that has never paid its own debt. The  mixture  of  serious  economic  hardship  and  disillusionment, together with hurt pride and prejudice, leads to political polarization and  a  strengthening  of  the  extremes,  both  left  and  right.  The heightened social tensions can easily lead to political upheavals with catastrophic  consequences  for  Greece’s  future.  In  these circumstances,  Prof.  Neumann’s  prediction  may  yet  come  true despite  Mrs.  Merkel’s  recent  visit  to  Athens  (on  9  October),  which was meant  to  reassure  Greece  of  Germany’s wish  to  avoid  a  Grexit and to encourage Greeks to stay the course. It  is  widely  expected  that  if  Antonis  Samaras(presently  presiding over a  three‐party coalition government)  fails,  the next government will  be  led  by  the  neo‐communist  party  Syriza.  Syriza  has consistently  opposed  the  Memorandum  and  seemed  to  opt  for  the repudiation of debt obligations and Greece’s exit  from the Eurozone rather than accept the conditions demanded by the troika.  Nevertheless,  given  the  unpopularity  of  a  return  to  the  drachma, Syriza has more recently changed its tune. Thus, in the run‐up to the June elections and since then, it insists that it wants Greece to remain in the eurozone while, at the same time, redoubling its attacks on the government for being pliable to the wishes of the troika and lacking the will  to  renegotiate  the Memorandum.  In  this,  and  possibly  only this, it is in full accord with the other three opposition parties: the old Communist Party, the Independent Greeks, which is a splinter group from the right of New Democracy, and the neo‐fascist Golden Dawn, which is rapidly rising in popularity. 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It  is  clear  that  the most  important  and  urgent  political  issue  is  the negotiation  with  the  troika  and,  indeed,  the  continued  stay  or  exit from  the  eurozone.  Syriza  wishes  to  draw  a  number  of  red  lines (mostly regarding cuts in wages and pensions, liberalization of labor laws and, possibly above all,  redundancies  in  the public sector) and seems to be willing to take the risk of Greece being pushed out of the eurozone. This inference is also supported by the fact that Syriza has never  declared  that  a  Greek  exit  would  be  an  unmitigated  disaster and has not denounced a number of voices in favor of an exit, which come from within its own ranks and sympathizers. In  all  probability,  a  return  to  the drachma under Syriza would be  a return  to  the past with a vengeance. This  is because Syriza’s  recipe for  a  revival  of  the  Greek  economy  is  through  a  rise  in  public spending. A devaluation‐inflation  spiral would  inevitably  follow but the  unholy  alliance  of  political  parties,  the  media  and  state‐dependent contractors and suppliers, which are presently effectively bankrupt and clearly on a retreat, would be given a new lease of life. Public  sector  employment would  increase but  the  lack of  structural competitiveness,  which  is  the  crucial  problem  and  constitutes  the major  impediment  to  the  developmental  prospects  of  the  Greek economy, would not be addressed.  In  fact,  structural  competitiveness  (which  is  the  ability  to  compete internationally  without  the  aid  of  devaluation)  would  certainly deteriorate  in  the  absence  of  labor  market  reforms.  The  cost  of bureaucracy,  which  according  to  European  Commission  estimates, amounts  to  6.8%  of  GDP  (nearly  twice  the  EU  average),  would probably  get  worse  with  the  strengthening  of  the  public  sector unions under Syriza and this would further damage competitiveness. Privatization  efforts  of  the  inordinately  large  state  property  would certainly be abandoned and the mismanagement and exploitation of state assets by para‐statist rings, often with the collusion of political parties, would continue as in the past.  The  point  is  that  the  structural  reforms  contained  in  the Memorandum and the reforms needed not only  in  the  labor market and the public administration but also in the judiciary and, arguably above all,  in  the  financing and operation of  the political parties,  are ignored  by  Syriza,  which  rejects  the  Memorandum  in  its  entirety. Syriza’s message is that once we get rid of the Memorandum, we can reverse the reductions in civil servants’ salaries and pensions and go back  to  the  good  old  days.  It  is  exactly  the  nostalgia  for  the  recent 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past that has caused the shift of the strong public sector trade unions from PASOK to Syriza, along with the most populist elements of  the socialist party’s apparatus, which most benefited from the expansion of  the  state.  The  only  difference  from  the  past,  according  to  Syriza, will be that the rich will pay more taxes. In  the rather unlikely case  that Syriza does not opt  for an exit  from the  euro,  the  recipe  does  not  seem  to  substantially  vary.  The government primary deficit will need  to be eliminated and  this will be done, by exclusively  increasing  tax receipts.  In  this case,  the rich (and only the rich) will pay a lot more taxes. There  is  no question  that  the  rich  should pay  their proper  share of tax. The need  for better collection of  taxes  is beyond dispute, as  tax evasion  is  rampant. And,  of  course,  there  is  a need  for  an equitable and operationally simple tax system, which citizens recognize as fair and, at the same time, minimizes tax collectors’ corruption and does not militate against enterprise and development. But the problem is not so much that the rich don’t pay taxes as that, those who can hide their income do not pay taxes.  Self‐employment,  especially  in  services,  provides  comparatively more opportunities to hide one’s income. This applies in all countries, the more so  in  those  lacking a highly developed sense of civic duty, while  high  tax  rates  on  transactions  certainly  don’t  help.  In Greece, the  self‐employed  are  the  highest  proportion  of  the  labor  force among  all  OECD  countries.  Also,  small  family‐run  firms  with  a minimal  number  of  non‐family  employees  constitute  the  vast majority  of  firms  in  the  Greek  economy.  Moreover,  trust  in  the government  is  low  and, with  a  VAT  at  23%,  the  buyer  of  a  service provided by a self‐employed supplier has a significant  incentive not to demand a receipt.  In  this way,  the buyer gets a discount equal  to the  amount of  the  tax  and,  of  course,  the  seller does not  report  the transaction and does not pay income tax on it. This explains how the average  income  of  the  self‐employed,  from  doctors  to  plumbers  to small shopkeepers (and there are proportionately more of the latter than  in  any  OECD  country),  turns  out  to  be  a  small  fraction  of  the average salaried person’s income.  What  can  be  done  about  this  predicament?  There  is  a  great  Greek success story  in the  international economic arena, which provides a cue to what should be done. This  is  international shipping,  in which Greece leads the world. Greece has managed this by having a simple and  stable  (because  it  is  enshrined  in  the Constitution)  tonnage  tax 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Endnotes                                                          i  Ralph  Keyes  The Wit  and Wisdom  of  Harry  S.  Truman,  New  York, Gramercy Books, 1999.   ii Martin Feldstein  “EMU and  International Conflict”, Foreign Affairs, 76 (6), 1997. A lot of the pessimism expressed from different sides of the political spectrum about the prospects of the euro, was based on the  fact  that  the  euro  zone  clearly  did  not  fulfill  the  conditions  for success,  as  set  out  by  the  theory  of  optimal  currency  areas.  See, Robert  Mundell  “A  Theory  of  Optimum  Currency  Areas”,  American 





Eurointelligence, January 9, 2012.   viii This seems to be Professor Neumann’s view. A strict enforcement of  the  fiscal  rules  is  not  only  a  necessary  but  also  a  sufficient condition  for  the  resolution  of  the  debt  crisis.  If  Greece  cannot restore  fiscal  balance,  it will  be  shown  the  exit  from  the  euro  zone. The temporary shock to the economy will be manageable and, in the long  run,  the  euro  zone  will  rest  on  a  more  stable  foundation. Imbalances in productivity and growth among member states cannot be precluded but  they will  lead  to  labor  flows  from weak  to  strong economies rather than resource transfers from strong to weak ones.   ix  The  fiscal  compact  has  been  criticized  for  its  fuzziness  and, especially, the absence of an objective criterion for action. Automatic correction  is  to  be  effected  “in  the  event  of  significant(?)  observed deviations  from  the medium‐term objective  or  the  adjustment  path towards  it”  unless    exceptional(?)  circumstances,  which  are  not further specified, happen to prevail.  It has been noted that by making a state’s structural fiscal deficit the main operational criterion, it puts “an unmeasurable concept  into the law”. See, Martin Wolf “The pain in Spain will test the euro”, Financial Times, March 7, 2012.   x    Jean Monnet was  the  key  early  architect  of  Europe. Monnet  said: “We  are  not  forming  coalitions  of  states, we  are  uniting men”  on  a march together toward a common European destiny.   xi  Lawrence  Summers  “Five  grim  and  essential  lessons  for  world leaders”, Financial Times, November 2, 2011.  Summers’  five  lessons have  been  condensed,  for  economy,  to  the  most  important  three lessons that are presented here. The world leaders are the Group of 20, who were meeting in Cannes at the time.   xii  It  is clear  that,  if  this  is  true,  it has  important  implications  for  the interpretation  and  writing  of  history.  The  rationality  of  the  main actors  cannot  be  taken  for  granted  and  may  not  guide  all  their 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actions.  This  means  that  the  rational  interest  of  the  actors  or  “the logic of the situation” may not suffice to explain the actors’ behavior at  possibly  crucial  historical  junctures.  Consequently,  the psychological  state  and motivations of  the protagonists needs  to be understood  and  taken  into  account,  in  order  to  accurately reconstruct  historical  events.  But  the  further  away  in  time  we  are from the event to be explained, the more difficult it becomes to have reliable information regarding the psychological setup of the relevant actors.  As  a  result,  the  common  notion  that  older  events  can  be explained better than recent ones, seems to be contradicted.  There  seem  to be  two  reasons  for  the usual  position  that  historical accounts of older events are more reliable than those of more recent ones,  both  of  which  relate  to  rationality.  Firstly,  there  is  a presupposition that there is less passion and irrational feelings about events further in the past, allowing a more rational assessment of the actors’ actions. The second presupposition underlying this orthodox view is that all consequences of older events have been realized and become apparent. Then history can be interpreted as the outcome of rational  (maybe  even  super‐rational)  actors  who  intended  these consequences.  
xiii  Pride  and  especially  prejudice  as  exhibited  in  the  chauvinist stereotypes,  such  as  “Greeks  are  lazy  or  liars”  and  “Germans  are arrogant or autocratic”, are clearly dangerous and can quite evidently undermine European solidarity if left unchecked. Here, the reference is to their less obvious role in clinging on dubious economic doctrines and the shaping of economic policy.   
xiv  Robert  J.  Shiller  “The  Great  Debt  Scare”,  Project  Syndicate, September 23, 2011. The relevant index, from the Thomson‐Reuters University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers, which reached 135 ‐ its highest‐ever  point  in  2000,  had  dropped  to  88  in May 2011  and  in only  4  months  it  further  fell  to  48  in  September,  following  the months‐long deadlock over the US government’s debt ceiling and the stories  about  imminent  sovereign  debt  default  in  Greece  and  other European states. 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xv    Adam M. Brandenburger  and Barry  J. Nalebuff, Co­opetition,  New York: Doubleday, 1996. 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